

## 1. Overview

**Receptivity:** A subject can have epistemic contact with entities (objects, properties, states) only insofar as it is *affected* by those entities.

McClelland: (1) Phenomenal self-knowledge aside, Receptivity is appealing, but (2) Receptivity is undermined by phenomenal self-knowledge.

## 2. Is Receptivity appealing?

Receptivity has problems with...

- necessary truths
- the effects rather than the causes of what one is in most direct contact with
- one's own actions

When restricted to *non-inferential* knowledge... Receptivity still might face the above problems.

When restricted to *perceptual* knowledge... it's arguably trivial, and arguably too restricted to be threatened by phenomenal self-knowledge.

## 3. Is Receptivity undermined by phenomenal self-knowledge?

The "not distinct existences" premises in the "first pass" arguments:

(A5) A subject's awareness at t and their phenomenology at t are not distinct existences.

*"...A5 proposes that a conscious state and what that conscious state is like cannot be distinct existences."*

(C5) A subject's awareness at t and their awareness of their awareness are not distinct existences.

Strawson quote: *"...what would it be like to be conscious of something without being aware of this consciousness? It would mean having an experience with no awareness whatever of its occurrence. This would be, precisely, a case of unconscious experience."*

These motivations arguably equivocate. The motivation for A5 equivocates between the subject's awareness of external objects that is (allegedly) constituted by the conscious state and one's awareness of the conscious state itself. The Strawsonian motivation for C5 equivocates between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness.

The "non-structural properties" premises in the "second pass" arguments:

(B3) The properties constitutive of the phenomenal character of a state are non-structural properties.

*"No amount of purely structural knowledge could capture the redness of red."*

(D3) The nature of awareness is non-structural.

*"Unless you are an Analytic Functionalist, you will take the causal profile of awareness to be conceptually distinct from awareness itself."*

These motivations take conceptual/epistemic distinctness to entail metaphysical distinctness.