Course Description:
This course will focus on recent debates in social epistemology, particularly those concerning the rationality of trust in oneself and in others. Our central questions will include: When is it rational to believe the testimony of another person? When is it rational to persist in beliefs that you came to hold in the past? How should you respond to disagreement from an epistemic peer, who appears to be as reasonable, informed, and intelligent as you, but whose beliefs regarding controversial questions contradict your own? Is it rational for you to persist in beliefs that you know you would have rejected had you been raised in another family or culture? How should you respond to evidence supporting that you might not be as trustworthy as you previously believed?
Course Documents and Links:
Readings:
ADDED: David Barnett, ‘Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?’
- Thomas Kelly, ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement’
- David Christensen, ‘The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News’
- Roger White, ‘Epistemic Permissivness’
- Miriam Schoenfield, ‘Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What It Tells Us about Irrelevant Influences on Belief’
- Richard Feldman, ‘Respecting the Evidence’
- Sophie Horowitz, ‘Epistemic Akrasia’
- Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat’
- Miriam Schoenfield, ‘A Dilemma for Calibrationism’
- David Christensen, ‘Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia’
- John Greco, ‘Justification is Not Internal’
- Richard Feldman, ‘Justification is Internal’
- Matthew McGrath, ‘Memory and Epistemic Conservatism’
- Frank Jackson, ‘Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Beliefs’
- Andrew Moon, ‘Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem’
- Brian Weatherson, ‘Memory, Belief, and Time’