I work mostly in epistemology and philosophy of mind, but with connections to decision theory, ethics, and the history of philosophy. My papers deal with different topics but the overarching concerns are the first-person perspective and self-consciousness. You can read more here.
If you’re not here looking for a specific paper or topic, you might try ‘Reflection Deflated’, ‘Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?’, or ‘Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater’, which are all fairly general-interest.
Graded Ratifiability: 2022, Journal of Philosophy 119(2): 57-88.
Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore’s Paradox (handout, published version): 2021, Philosophical Review 130(2): 227-262.
Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater (handout): 2019, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (runner-up, Sanders Prize in Epistemology).
Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief: 2016, Nous 50(1): 184-212.
Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?: 2015, Philosophical Review 124(3): 353-392.
What’s the Matter With Epistemic Circularity? (handout): 2014, Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Internalism, Stored Beliefs, and Forgotten Evidence (handout): forthcoming, Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology, Stephen Wright and Sanford Goldberg (eds.), OUP.
Works in Progress
Intellectual Autonomy and the Cartesian Circle (abstract)
Comments on James Doyle’s discussion of Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’ in his No Morality, No Self (handout)
Comments on Nathan Ballantyne’s ‘Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Skepticism’
Comments on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s ‘Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure’
Comments on Tom McClelland’s ‘Receptivity and Phenomenal Self-Knowledge’
Comments on Ted Everett’s ‘Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rationality’
Comments on Tom Kelly’s ‘Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment’
Comments on Jamie Dreier’s ‘Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement’