Perception and Epistemology

Readings for September 19:

Readings for September 26:

Readings for October 17:

Readings for October 17:

Readings for November 14:

Readings for November 21:

Note from Imogen Dickie regarding November 28:

We’ll continue our discussion of the ‘How?’ question by looking at three views of the relationship between perception, reference, and justification: Evans, Campbell, and Smithies. At this stage in the term, I won’t suppose that anybody has read anything. But if you have time on your hands this afternoon and wanting look at something self-contained, you could read Smithies’ ‘What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?’ and/or ‘Attention is Rational Access Consciousness’.

Note from Imogen Dickie regarding December 5th:

On Monday I’ll go through my own account of how perception justifies perceptual demonstrative belief, show how it extends into a solution to the problem of other minds, and consider some background and adjacent issues.

Reading – I won’t suppose that anybody has read anything. If you do have time to read something:


a) Shortest option – Fixing Reference Ch 1 pp 1-6 (up to ‘By the end of the book I shall have shown how.’)

b) Longer option – ‘Cognitive Focus‘ sections 1 and 2.

c) Longer again – The perceptual demonstratives Ch of Fixing Reference is Ch4. Ch4 should be understandable given Ch 1 pp 1-6; EITHER Ch 2 without the appendices, OR ‘Cognitive Focus’ sections 1 and 2 (much shorter than Ch 2 of the book) ; Ch 3.

Other people

a) McDowell ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’

b) Lycan ‘Noninductive Evidence’ American Philosophical Quarterly 1971